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Introduction 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is the effective use of all resources to minimize 
errors, increase flight safety, and improve performance (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).  
CRM has matured and developed into a formidable and globally accepted flight safety device 
since its introduction in the 1970s.  CRM has experienced significant growth and evolved to 
rightfully claim its position as a premier aviation safety tool.  During its progression period, 
CRM was considered a trend and even labeled a psychological brainwash for pilots (Helmreich 
et al., 1999).   
Safety Management Systems (SMS) is the latest mechanism being used to improve an 
industry with an already exceptional aviation safety record.  With the official introduction of 
SMS, the aviation industry is trying, once again, to adapt to something new.  This study explores 
the evolution of SMS and CRM and how they relate to one another.  The paper will compare and 
contrast SMS and CRM to determine if they have a historical and practical relationship.  The 
paper will highlight the differences and similarities of each and examine whether or not SMS and 
CRM share historical and practical resemblances.  By analyzing the past and current practices of 
both, the authors of this research will demonstrate how SMS and CRM synchronize, cross paths, 
and share a future.  Together, these programs have the potential to enhance aviation safety.  
Literature Review 
SMS and CRM 
SMS and CRM “identify and evaluate operational-type hazards, […] consider human 
system integration factors such as human error, human task overload, cognitive misconception, 
[and] the effect on humans or hardware failure” (Lu, Bos, & Caldwell, 2007, p. 33).  The CRM 
concept is based on providing quality products through teamwork and plays a major role in 
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safety management.  Various industries, such as the automobile and aviation industries, relied on 
human factors to reinvent and better redefine the concept of quality products through effective 
teamwork during the mid-1970s to mid-1990s (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012).   
Both SMS and CRM involve the safe operation of systems and effective teamwork to 
produce quality products.  CRM became accepted in the aviation industry in the late 1970s, 
while the larger all-encompassing system safety concept was adopted in the aviation industry 
with the help of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  In the early 2000s, ICAO 
required member states implement SMS for air traffic services (Bayuk, 2008).  The addition of 
SMS to the aviation industry reached a turning point when aviation safety shifted from a human-
error to larger system concept (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012).  This overarching system concept 
includes technical, human, and organizational factors (ICAO, 2009) that influence aviation 
operations. 
Defining SMS 
The FAA has been incorporating system safety into aviation policy for a while.  The FAA 
requires the Office of System Safety to “incorporate a risk management process for all high-
consequences decisions and provide a handbook/manual of System Risk Management and to 
recommend tools of System Safety to all U.S.-based airlines” (FAA, 1996, p.1, as cited in Lu et 
al., 2007).  Various system safety measures are used regularly in the aviation industry and 
enforced by regulatory agencies. 
SMS is one example of a system safety method.  ICAO (2009) defines SMS as an 
organized approach to managing safety, to include the necessary organizational structures, 
accountabilities, policies, and procedures.  The four pillars of SMS are: 1) Safety Policy, 2) Risk 
Management, 3) Safety Assurance, and 4) Safety Promotion.  The Federal Aviation 
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Administration (FAA) has embraced SMS in its Advisory Circular (AC) 120-92A and describes 
each of the components.  The four components are explicated as follows: 
• Safety policy – establishes senior management’s commitment to continually improve 
safety; defines the methods, processes, and organizational structure needed to meet 
the safety goals. 
• Safety Risk Management (SRM) – determines the need for, and adequacy of, new or 
revised risk controls based on the assessment of acceptable risk. 
• Safety assurance (SA) – evaluates the continued effectiveness of implemented risk 
control strategies; supports the identification of new hazards. 
• Safety promotion – includes training, communication, and other actions to create a 
positive safety culture within all levels of the workforce. (FAA, 2010; Stolzer, 
Halford, & Goglia, 2008) 
CRM: A Brief History 
CRM was a product of human factors research in the 1970s.  In 1979, NASA conducted a 
workshop titled Resource Management on the Flightdeck.  Analysis of accident causes revealed 
66% of air carriers, 79% of commuters, and 88% of general aviation accidents were the result of 
flight crew failures in interpersonal communication, decision making, and leadership, not weak 
technical flying skills (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1980; Helmreich et al., 1999).  Consequently, 
air carriers accepted the task of incorporating team performance education into their flight 
training programs.  Cockpit Resource Management, the term previously used, focused on the 
psychological and behavioral aspects of team performance, specifically, the over-authoritarian 
leadership styles of captains, and the lack of assertiveness in many first officers.  Some human 
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factors items CRM incorporates are communication, decision-making, and teamwork (Lima, 
2000).   
Human factors concepts evolved through the development of CRM.  First-generation 
CRM failed to take into account how different cultures behave in a hierarchal environment, such 
as a cockpit.  These training programs encountered much resistance from pilots, who saw them 
as an attempt to manipulate their personalities (Helmreich et al., 1999).  First generation CRM 
courses were characterized by seminar-styled lectures on managerial and psychological aspects 
of pilot interactions.  
The second generation of CRM emphasized team work (Lima, 2000).  By introducing 
topics such as team building, briefing strategies, situation awareness, and stress management, the 
name Cockpit Resource Management changed to Crew Resource Management.  In addition to 
the importance of team dynamics, the training environment began to resemble situations 
specifically within aviation operations.  During the early 1990s, the third generation of CRM, 
training extended to other groups, such as flight attendants, dispatchers, and maintenance 
personnel (Block, Sabin, & Patankar, 2007).  Additional topics included organizational culture 
and pilot-behavioral competencies for improved safety performance.  
In the 1990s, the FAA introduced a major change in flight crew training and 
qualifications called Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) (Helmreich et al., 1999).  This 
game-changing event marked the beginning of the fourth generation of CRM.  
AQP is a voluntary program that allows air carriers to develop innovative training [to fit] 
the needs of the specific organization.  In exchange for this greater flexibility in training, 
carriers are required to provide both CRM and LOFT [Line-Oriented Flight Training] for 
all flight crews and to integrate CRM concepts into technical training. […]  To complete 
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the shift to AQP, carriers are required to complete detailed analyses of training 
requirements for each aircraft and to develop programs that address the human factors 
(CRM) issues in each aspect of training. In addition, special training for those charged 
with certification of crews and formal evaluation of crews in full mission simulation is 
required (Line Operational Evaluation or LOE).  (Helmreich et al., 1999, p. 21) 
Specific behaviors and CRM training concepts were processed into checklists.  The 
fourth generation saw an increase in written operating procedures. 
The fifth generation of CRM introduced the concept of Threat and Error Management 
(TEM).  It is accepted that errors cannot be eliminated, but perhaps avoided, managed, and its 
effects mitigated.  Helmreich et al. (1999) argued that CRM provides valuable countermeasures 
to avoid, trap, and mitigate errors.  The fifth generation also attempted to use this human factors 
based CRM to “engage all employees in building a robust safety culture and emphasizes cases 
where errors were detected and managed effectively” (Block et al., 2007).  Currently, at its fifth-
generation, CRM is finally embraced by the aviation industry.  “The industry now is pursuing a 
CRM training concept that could be accepted universally and accommodate local cultural 
aspects” (Lima, 2000, para. 24).  Decades later, CRM is still a work in progress.  CRM is more 
widely accepted and practiced in the aviation industry today, decades after it was officially 
introduced. 
Human and organizational factors are cornerstones of CRM, which relies on training to 
identify and understand potential system failures before they become unsafe.  CRM is a practical 
tool used to “develop skills to help better manage threats and errors that pilots face during every 
flight” (Maurino & Murray, 2010, p. 10-16).  The CRM shift from ‘training for the abnormal’ to 
‘training for the normal’ allows operators to avoid potential disasters through their experience 
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and familiarity with a predictive failure through practice (Maurino & Murray, 2010, p. 10-3).  
Training for the predictive failure allows CRM to be proactive in the system safety concept, 
ultimately, in SMS.  The difference with CRM is its tactical application versus SMS’s strategic, 
all-encompassing application.  Whereas SMS is a planned and calculated approach that is 
cultivated in upper-management and spreads all the way to the user level, CRM is intended 
primarily for the user.   
Although CRM was officially introduced by airlines in the early 1980s, it was not 
immediately welcomed by the aviation industry.  Initial courses were psychological in nature 
with a special emphasis on concepts such as leadership; thus, many of these courses encountered 
opposition from pilots who denounced them as a way to manipulate their personalities 
(Helmreich et al., 1999).  However, with the evolution of safety thinking, CRM has transitioned 
to a globally accepted practice.  Regardless of the difficulties in proving its relationship with 
safety, air carriers today would have difficulties terminating such a program (Pariès & 
Amalberti, as cited by Maurino & Murray, 2010).  
Summary 
Managing and controlling errors, hazards, and risks are all part of the overarching safety 
system defined as SMS.  CRM is a key component of this system.  Both SMS and CRM seek to 
identify root causes of undesired events.  SMS and CRM aim at being predictive and proactive in 
improving operational safety.  To anticipate human mistakes, both attempt to discover potential 
system failures before they occur.  The anticipation of the potential human mistake is 
incorporated into SMS and CRM through risk management controls.  SMS and CRM recognize 
and assess hazards in order to develop corrective mitigations against assessed threats.   
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Research Approach 
The purpose of the study is to gain a better understanding of how SMS and CRM interact.  
The study was guided by the following research questions: 
• What similarities and differences exist in the evolution of SMS and CRM? 
• What is the future direction of both SMS and CRM?    
To answer these questions, an extensive literature review was conducted.  The units of 
analysis included any article, document, form, rule, or study revealing the development of SMS 
and CRM.  Relevant information from these sources were separated and entered individually into 
a computer-aided qualitative data analysis software called QSR NVivo.  The use of such 
qualitative analysis software allowed the authors the opportunity to explore emerging themes and 
search for relationships between both concepts (i.e., SMS and CRM).  
Parallels and Opposites in their Evolution 
Both SMS and CRM share common roots in Human Factors.  It was the study of human 
factors that led to the term organizational accident (Reason, 1990).  In addition, CRM has 
progressed from one generation to the next in marked fashion.  CRM originated in the U.S. 
whereas SMS came from a global organization (i.e., ICAO).  While SMS is a “systematic 
approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, 
policies, and procedures” (Galotti, 2006, para. 9), CRM is a critical tool of a safety system.  SMS 
is the ultimate overarching product of the evolution of safety thinking.   
Although both have been around for some time, SMS is not as widely accepted by the 
aviation industry as CRM.  SMS is currently transitioning to some parts of the aviation industry.  
ICAO has made a recommendation that all countries enforce SMS upon their aviation service 
providers (Hollinger, 2013).  ICAO even provided multiple editions of the Safety Management 
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Manual (SMM) for countries to use as guidance in building their own SMS.  The manual is 
thorough in providing safety organizational management concepts and implementation 
techniques.   
The application of safety has inherently been mentioned in various ways over the last 
century.  Terms such as 1) system safety, 2) safety management, 3) risk management, and 4) 
hazard identification all have the ultimate goal of improving safety.  The goal of improving 
safety has been around for decades.  The idea of groups of people working safely and effectively 
together has also been around for decades, as well.  Unlike CRM, there were no specific aviation 
incidents or accidents that triggered the movement towards SMS.  In any case, SMS improves on 
an already fine industry safety record.  Both SMS and CRM took a while to evolve into 
something measurable.   
SMS and CRM Cross Paths 
The focus of the first CRM generation was on pilot personalities and individual 
hazardous attitudes that caused accidents; it did not have similarities with the early development 
of SMS (Helmreich et al., 1999).  The second generation emphasizes group dynamics in the 
cockpit (Lima, 2000).  CRM and SMS meet during the former’s third generation.   
According to Maurino and Murray (2010), CRM started to incorporate a bigger system to 
include flight attendants, dispatchers, maintenance, and air traffic control.  The fact that CRM 
training began transcending the cockpit door indicates a shift towards system safety.  The third 
generation of CRM was “a change in its underlying safety paradigm: safety was now considered 
to be a proactive rather than reactive endeavor, and the consequence of a healthy system and its 
eﬀective performance” (p. 10-4).  This period occurred in the 1990s and was greatly influenced 
by James Reason’s (1990, 1997) research on the concept of an aviation organizational accident.  
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The idea that safety, in a flight operational context, is the result of the overall health of a 
system was highlighted during the fourth generation of CRM.  This generation shares common 
aspects with SMS in that CRM training follows a proficiency-based method, instead of a 
prescriptive approach where the governing authority (i.e., FAA) prescribes the rules and 
techniques for crew training.  This training concept is called advanced qualification program 
(AQP).  It is a departure from the reactive approach to safety.  Instead, it is a more proactive 
approach in which the crew’s training is tailored to the organization’s specific needs, similar to 
SMS training (Stolzer et al., 2008).   
The AQP is type-specific (Maurino & Murray, 2010).  This signifies that for an AQP 
training to take place, the air carrier must first “conduct an aircraft-type specific task analysis 
that includes the identification of CRM behaviors pertinent to the execution of piloting tasks, 
within the context in which the task will be developed (p. 10-11).  These steps share many 
similarities with SMS.  Before implementing an SMS, a gap analysis must be done.   
The first step on identifying sources of safety vulnerability, specified, as hazards in the 
interfaces between people and other components of the system, is the system description.  
Once the system is described in terms of components and interactions, the second step is 
to address these safety vulnerabilities […] through an analysis of the resources already 
present in the system.  (ICAO Doc. 9859, 2009, p. 131) 
In summary, a mature SMS and a successful CRM AQP program require a complete 
process description.  Others who felt CRM may impact a whole system, similar to SMS, expand 
upon the advantages of CRM.  
In this aspect, Paries and Amalberti advocated the term cross-corporate or Company 
Resource Management to reflect that the benefits of CRM extend beyond safety to 
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include cost efficiency, service quality, and job satisfaction.  The term Organizational 
Resource Management (ORM) reflects the same line of thinking (Heinzer, 1993), fully 
developed by Smith (1992), who viewed CRM as an organizational development.  
(Maurino & Murray, 2010, p. 10-4)  
The Significance of Error Management in SMS and CRM 
Similarities between SMS and CRM become prominent in the fifth generation of CRM 
with the introduction of threat and error management (TEM).  In the late 1990s, it became 
evident there was no way of eliminating human error.  Flight crews were often using tactics to 
minimize and mitigate errors found during abnormal and normal (day-to-day) activities.  These 
strategies during operational CRM were termed Error Management (Helmreich et al., 1999).  
TEM made its way into CRM by the end of the 1990s.  
Threat and error management (TEM) is a systems approach to aviation safety originally 
developed by human factors researchers at the University of Texas.  Embraced by airlines 
worldwide and recognized as an international best practice by, among others, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the Joint Aviation Authorities, the 
International Air Transport Association, the National Air Transport Association, and the 
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, TEM offers an intuitive and flexible approach to 
practical risk management.  TEM not only offers a framework for understanding and 
directing human performance in complex operating environments, it also provides 
aviation professionals — regardless of their organizational function or status — a risk 
management lexicon that supports a positive safety culture.  (Flight Safety Foundation, 
2014, para. 1) 
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TEM can be used to classify a wide variety of factors that lead to incidents or aviation 
safety events in normal and abnormal situations (Stolzer et al., 2008).  During TEM, pilots 
attempt to manage safety by: (1) avoiding errors, (2) trapping errors, and (3) mitigating errors.  
This three-level safety defense tool is analogous to SMS since both attempt to uncover hazards 
and manage risk.  
Stolzer et al. (2008) continue explaining how TEM can interact with an organization’s 
SMS.  When it comes to the classification of hazards, it is very important users employ a 
taxonomy that allows safety events or incidents to be reported with ease.  Stolzer et al. (2008) 
make a strong case for TEM because the information gathered lends itself easily for 
classification, review, and the study of factors contributing to unsafe events.  Therefore, TEM 
plays a major role in SMS.  TEM allows pilots to communicate in common SMS usable 
language.  Like SMS, TEM also advocates ownership and accountability.   
There are many parallels between SMS and TEM.  Both focus on latent threats.  With 
CRM, latent threats are those not blatantly observable at the crew level.  Instead, they are 
concealed within the nature of the particular operation or the aviation system, as is the case with 
SMS.  Examples of latent threats include poor maintenance procedures, unfortunate air traffic 
control practices, badly written operations manuals, and an inaccurate amount of Operations 
Specifications (Ops Specs).   
Refer to Table 1 for a quick summary of the previous sections.  The majority of these 
concepts cover broad themes explored throughout this research, such as origins, definitions, 
applications, and barriers for effective implementation.   
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Table 1 
Similarities and Differences of both Safety Management System (SMS) and Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) 
Similarities Differences 
SMS and CRM have their roots in Human Factors 
research; the understanding of human error and the 
concept of the organizational accident paved the way 
for both programs. 
Unlike CRM, SMS borrows concepts from Total 
Quality Management (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012). 
CRM and SMS advocate standardized and unambiguous 
procedures for normal or abnormal situations. 
For CRM practitioners, procedures are directly written 
only for crewmembers involved in flight operations 
(FAA, 2004).  In an SMS, duties and responsibilities 
are detailed for each staff member for routine and 
emergency operations (ICAO, 2009). 
SMS and CRM prepare for, manage, and address potential 
factors that impact critical safety issues; both programs 
detect threats and/or hazards and mitigate them before an 
accident occurs. 
A major part of an organization is concerned with 
threats and hazards within an SMS program, whereas 
CRM addresses potential safety factors that impact 
flight operations. 
 
Senior management commitment and organizational 
culture will affect individual and collective safety 
awareness and practice for both programs (Broyhill & 
Freiwald, 2012). 
In CRM, the leadership style of the captain will affect 
the collective safety practices within the cockpit 
(Helmreich et al., 1999). 
SMS and CRM are capable of utilizing routine safety 
education and/or recurrent training based on regulatory 
requirements and identified safety gaps in the 
operational setting (FAA, 2004; ICAO, 2009). 
System safety was used in various industries (i.e., 
marine, railroad) before SMS was recognized in the 
aviation industry, while CRM originated within the 
aviation industry and is currently being used in other 
industries (e.g., medicine, firefighting, off-shore oil 
industry) (Broome, 2011). 
 
CRM and SMS use voluntary safety programs/tools 
such as Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), and 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) to document, 
monitor, and study risk (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
Information from ASRS, FOQA, and ASAP can also 
be used in flight operations, thereby improving CRM 
practices. 
 
Both are used in aviation operations and experienced 
resistance during initial implementation. 
Because of the time factor advantage, CRM has gained 
wider acceptance (Gibson, 2007).  However, SMS is 
currently struggling with the implementation phase 
(Shacklette, 2013). 
SMS and CRM include hazard identification and risk 
management. 
SMS manages threats and errors for an organization, 
whereas CRM manages threats and errors during 
flight. 
CRM and SMS have difficulties demonstrating their 
effectiveness through empirical research. 
There is a current lack of publication, research, and 
forums in the CRM field (Howell, 2007); the opposite 
is true for SMS. 
Similar to CRM when it started, SMS implementation 
requires additional expertise, resources, and software 
which are not readily available to all organizations 
(Shacklette, 2013). 
SMS implementation also requires changes to many 
FAA operations, whereas CRM did not (Shacklette, 
2013).  Another challenge with SMS implementation is 
that it is concurrent with other major projects (i.e., 
NextGen, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, etc.) that 
regulatory agencies have oversight of. 
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What does the future hold for both SMS and CRM? 
Throughout the development of CRM, there has been an increase in a positive safety 
culture.  Values such as empowerment, information sharing, collaboration, and data usage have 
made CRM successful.  SMS programs will likely follow suit in order to obtain safety levels 
never achieved in commercial aviation (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012).  Technology and software 
combined with data mining techniques should push SMS from a proactive safety device to a 
predictive aviation safety solution (Stolzer et al., 2008).   
For effective safety tools to maintain their status, they must stay up to date with the 
changing aviation environment.  CRM is still progressing and continually experiencing change.  
Kern (2001) argues CRM is currently going through the sixth generation where the current focus 
is on how CRM incorporates automation, technology complacency, and its interaction with 
fatigue.  Others have suggested CRM is still evolving without a clear indicator of a generational 
mark (Beneigh, 2007; Gibson, 2007).  Regardless, the possible addition of a sixth generation 
demonstrates that CRM, a Human Factors based training mechanism that is currently evolving, is 
part of an overarching safety system, that may possibly be known as SMS.   
Hazard and risk identification are core principles of SMS.  They have become more 
defined and independent; risk analysis has become the foundation of fact-based decision-making 
(Stolzer et al., 2008).  SMS will inherently become more dependent as hazard and risk become 
more controlled items.  As risk assessment techniques continue to evolve and become easier to 
measure, SMS will become easier to incorporate into operations.  Other industries have 
vigorously applied the spirit of SMS into their organization (Stolzer et al., 2008).  It will only be 
a matter of time before SMS moves in full force across the aviation industry as CRM currently 
67
Velazquez and Bier: SMS and CRM Evolutions
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015
does.  A realistic and effective way of implementing and standardizing SMS among aviation 
service providers has actually been taking place.   
Voluntary programs, such as the FAA Safety Reporting System and Database (SRSD), 
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
(FOQA), Air Carrier Operations System Model (ACOSM), and Aviation Safety Action Program 
(ASAP) are risk management tools intended for top-level decision making based on bottom-up 
use and middle management supervision, thereby allowing the safety system as a whole to be 
incorporated from the top down.  For example, operators complete these voluntary reports so that 
middle-management can provide updates to upper management.  Upper management then uses 
this information to make future safety decisions based off hazard identification and risk 
management measures found in these reports.  These voluntary programs are effective because 
all levels, from the top down, are involved before measures are managed and controlled to 
reduce errors, hazards, and risks. 
Analytical arrangements, such as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and 
Effective Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) 
identify potential occurrences of undesired events, mishaps, and accidents to some extent.  
Similar to the voluntary programs previously mentioned, the FTA, FMECA, and MORT are 
tools that all levels, from top down, have access to.  They “identify accident postulates that lead 
to implementation of strategic safety prevention programs from the bottom-up” (Lu et al., 2007, 
p. 34).  Again, individuals at the highest level have information from middle-management and 
users to make informed safety decisions, a key aspect of SMS. 
The actual SMS designation itself has yet to reach top-management levels across the 
aviation industry as a whole; therefore, an SMS-specific safety culture has yet to reach fruition.  
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SMS requires serious support from top management within industry before it can have a 
significant impact on safety (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2011).  Once the idea of safety culture 
in SMS develops and permeates through all levels of leadership in industry, SMS will spread as 
CRM has.  Stolzer et al. (2011) claim safety promotion is truly the only way to make safety 
culture effective in an organization.  The transition of safety promotion from upper-management 
is a critical milestone SMS must reach before continuing on with its current fast-paced 
momentum.  When leadership promotes and reinforces an idea in an organization, the rest of the 
team will likely follow suit.  Like CRM, SMS will need to be spearheaded by senior 
management and nurtured within an evolving safety culture that can adequately accommodate it 
(Broyhill & Freiwald, 2012; Stolzer et al., 2008).  It is difficult to prove to senior management 
that a zero-accident rate is attributed to a more defined safety culture, such as the case with SMS.  
Safety professionals cannot show senior leadership how many accidents have been prevented by 
a stronger safety culture, but when an accident does occur, it usually uncovers a flaw in the 
organization’s safety culture (Stolzer et al., 2011). 
Although SMS currently appears to be experiencing a major hold-up due to weak 
acceptance from upper management across the board, SMS is actually moving along through 
industry at a much faster rate than many realize, even faster than CRM did during its initial 
stages.  It will require time for the official name to gain recognition before it matures into a 
championed safety instrument.  The idea of SMS has adjusted to industry needs to fulfill safety 
voids in detecting latent failures.  The actual terminology SMS itself will become common 
practice 10, 20, or 30 years from now.  General SMS objectives, to include service providers 
recognizing SMS and utilizing basic SMS guidelines (Block et al., 2007), have been taking place 
just not acknowledged industry-wide.   
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Continuous education and guidance to upper leadership will lead to a more SMS specific 
invested culture as it did for CRM.  Building an SMS specific safety culture is a major obstacle 
for SMS, as it was for CRM.  Additional barriers will need to be overcome in order for SMS to 
mature as a recognized worldwide safety tool.  These obstacles include lack of scientific 
validation, absence of clear guidance from regulatory oversight agencies, and shortage of data 
tracking, sharing, and monitoring for improved overall system safety.  However, once industry 
truly recognizes a minimal level of SMS safety culture has already been engrained in the aviation 
industry, it will be easier to recognize and embrace a safety system inherently living in aviation.  
A more organized and standardized safety system, in the form of SMS, will spawn quickly to the 
aviation industry and be as useful and embedded into aviation as CRM currently is. 
The Evolution of Safety and Human Factors Thinking 
In approximately twenty years, CRM went from a training tool that did not incorporate 
how different cultures behave in a hierarchal cockpit environment to an advanced and common 
worldwide training tool that manages and normalizes threat and errors by providing valuable 
countermeasures (Helmreich et al., 1999).  
ICAO announced SMS implementation in 2003; SMS manual was introduced by ICAO 
three years later in 2006 (Lu, Young, Schreckengast, & Chen, 2011).  In this short amount of 
time, airports worldwide already devoted heavy resources to comply with ICAO SMS 
requirements.  Similar to CRM, SMS is experiencing obstacles inherent in a new culture.  
However, SMS is moving along slightly quicker than CRM.   
The timeline in the following two pages illustrates the evolution of safety and human 
factors thinking from the early 20th century into the 21st century and is divided into two 
overarching categories: the Introduction of Safety and Human Factors from the 1900s into the 
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1990s and Safety and Human Factors in Aviation from the 1990s into the future.  Table 2 is 
divided into three eras, 1) Safety in Concept, 2) Safety through Administrations, and 3) Safety 
through Human Factors.  These three time periods cover the beginning form and thought of 
safety and human factors.  In Table 3, there are two critical time periods for safety and human 
factors in aviation, 1) Organizational Human Factors & Safety in Aviation and 2) Systematic & 
Shared Safety in Aviation.  Both tables demonstrate safety and human factor concepts 
simultaneously evolving and merging in the 1990s.   
Table 2 
1900s-1990s: Introduction of Safety & Human Factors 
1900s-1945 
Safety in Concept 
1945-1970s 
Safety through 
Administrations 
1970s-1990s 
Safety through Human 
Factors 
WWI (1914-1918) 
Prompted the development of 
aeromedical research and aviation 
psychology (Ferguson & Nelson, 
2013). 
Post WWII (1945+) 
Human factors research shifted 
from designing for the machine to 
designing for human capabilities 
(user-centered design concept) 
(Ferguson & Nelson, 2013). 
1979 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration workshop titled: 
Resource Management on the 
Flightdeck leads to Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) (Cooper, 
White, & Lauber, 1980). 
1926 
Air Commerce Act (NewMyer, 
2000). 
1947 
Establishment of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization 
(Adamski & Doyle, 2005) 
 
1980s 
CRM’s first generation training was 
primarily lecture-type format 
designed for indoctrination on 
management styles and 
interpersonal skills (Helmreich, 
Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).  1938 
Civil Aeronautics Act (NewMyer, 
2000).  
1958 
Federal Aviation Act (NewMyer, 
2000). 
 
1940s 
Introduction of system safety due to 
aviation and aerospace industry 
(Lu, Bos, & Caldwell, 2007). 
1967 
Formation of the National 
Transportation Safety Board 
(NewMyer, 2000).  
1980s 
CRM's second generation changed 
CRM from Cockpit to Crew 
Resource Management (Helmreich 
et al.,1999). 
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Table 3 
1990s-Future: Safety & Human Factors in Aviation 
1990s-2006 
Organizational Human Factors & 
Safety in Aviation 
2006-Future 
Systematic & Shared Safety in Aviation 
1990s 
Aviation safety philosophy shifted its focus to the 
organizational era, viewing safety from a systems 
perspective including technical, human, and 
organizational factors (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012). 
2006 
ICAO produces first manual, SMM (ICAO, 2009). 
1990s 
During its third generation, Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) hit mainstream; it now includes 
maintenance, dispatch, and air traffic controllers 
(Maurino & Murray, 2010). 
 
2006 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published 
Advisory Circular 120-92 Introduction to SMS for Air 
Operators (Lu, Bos, & Caldwell, 2007). 
1990s 
CRM's fourth generation saw the introduction of 
Advanced Qualification Program (Helmreich, Merritt, 
& Wilhelm, 1999). 
2007 
FAA initiated voluntary SMS pilot projects and 
voluntary implementation of SMS in the U.S. 
(Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012). 
1995 
Aviation Safety Summit (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 
2008). 
2009 
FAA publishes Risk Management Handbook where 
Single-Pilot Resource Management (single-pilot CRM) 
is discussed (FAA, 2009). 
Late 1990s 
CRM's fifth generation uses Threat and Error 
Management (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
2010 
FAA Notice of Proposed Rule Making extends SMS 
from airlines to certificated airports (Lu, 
Schreckengast, & Jia, 2011). 
Early 2000s 
ICAO requires member states establish a Safety 
Management System (SMS) for the provision of air 
traffic services (Bayuk, 2008). 
Present 
CRM focuses on automation, technology, and fatigue. 
2006 
ICAO publishes Safety Management Manual (SMM); 
Safety Management System (SMS) starts; 4 pillars of 
SMS defined as (a) safety policy, (b) risk management, 
(c) safety assurance, and (d) safety promotion (ICAO, 
2009). 
2020s 
Both CRM and SMS will place greater emphasis on 
quantitative methods for prediction and safety; these 
efforts include data mining and probabilistic methods. 
 
2020s 
SMS will reach other aviation domains such as 14 
Code of Federal Regulation Parts 91, 141, 142, and 
135. 
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Conclusion 
Similar to what CRM supporters experienced decades ago, SMS advocates are attempting 
to build a name and reputation for SMS across the aviation industry, to include academia.  In 
2007, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) Bombardier, and Frasca co-hosted a 
symposium titled "ERAU: CRM Vectors 2007.”  Such an event looked at the current state of 
CRM and forecasted its direction into the new decade.  The symposium accurately predicted that 
CRM concepts would extend to the single-pilot domain and that educational guidelines would be 
developed for General Aviation (GA) pilots searching to benefit from CRM concepts when 
flying alone.  Two years later, the FAA published a Risk Management Handbook (2009), 
covering topics such as automation, risk management, and Single-Pilot Resource Management. 
It is effective to implement safety tools in the academic environment.  The Aviation 
Accreditation Board International (AABI) currently requires all collegiate aviation programs 
seeking accreditation to develop and use some form of safety management or aviation SMS 
(AABI, 2013).  In addition, SMS is required for airports and FAA Part 121 operations while 
CRM is required for FAA Part 121 and 135 operations.  Flight schools have been teaching CRM 
principles in the classroom for many years.  SMS principles will likely reach FAA Part 141, 142, 
135, and 91 operations. 
CRM and SMS will continue to evolve in their respective applications.  They will benefit 
from data sharing to further reduce the likelihood of an aviation accident.  Certain approaches 
work well with both programs.  A prime example is the continual inclusion of Human Factors, 
which will be a constant element in CRM and SMS, like it has been since their development.  
Improving safety through CRM and SMS training will continually be a work in progress.  
Similar to CRM during its early years, SMS has a long way to go.  CRM will continue to push its 
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cockpit and operational crew boundaries in favor of a systems approach to safety.  CRM will 
remain a pivotal tool in the SMS toolbox, and SMS will progress in the aviation industry.  
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